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Steel Bridge Construction

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45.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses some of the principles and practices applicable to the construction of medium- and long-span steel bridges — structures of such size and complexity that construction engineering becomes an important or even the governing factor in the successful fabrication and erection of the superstructure steelwork.

We begin with an explanation of the fundamental nature of construction engineering, then go on to explain some of the challenges and obstacles involved. The basic considerations of cambering are explained. Two general approaches to the fabrication and erection of bridge steelwork are described, with examples from experience with arch bridges, suspension bridges, and cable-stayed bridges.

The problem of erection-strength adequacy of trusswork under erection is considered, and a method of appraisal offered that is believed to be superior to the standard working-stress procedure.

Typical problems with respect to construction procedure drawings, specifications, and practices are reviewed, and methods for improvement suggested. The need for comprehensive bridge erection-engineering specifications, and for standard conditions for contracting, is set forth, and the design-and-construct contracting procedure is described.

Finally, we take a view ahead, to the future prospects for effective construction engineering in the U.S.

The chapter also contains a large number of illustrations showing a variety of erection methods for several types of major steel bridges.

45.2 Construction Engineering in Relation to Design Engineering

With respect to bridge steelwork the differences between construction engineering and design engineering should be kept firmly in mind. Design engineering is of course a concept and process well known to structural engineers; it involves preparing a set of plans and specifications — known as the contract documents — that define the structure in its completed configuration, referred to as the geometric outline. Thus, the design drawings describe to the contractor the steel bridge superstructure that the owner wants to see in place when the project is completed. A considerable design engineering effort is required to prepare a good set of contract documents.

Construction engineering, however, is not so well known. It involves governing and guiding the fabrication and erection operations needed to produce the structural steel members to the proper cambered or “no-load” shape, and get them safely and efficiently “up in the air” in place in the structure, so that the completed structure under the deadload conditions and at normal temperature will meet the geometric and stress requirements stipulated on the design drawings.

Four key considerations may be noted: (1) design engineering is widely practiced and reasonably well understood, and is the subject of a steady stream of technical papers; (2) construction engineering is practiced on only a limited basis, is not as well understood, and is hardly ever discussed; (3) for medium- and long-span bridges, the construction engineering aspects are likely to be no less important than design engineering aspects; and (4) adequately staffed and experienced construction-engineering offices are a rarity.

45.3 Construction Engineering Can Be Critical

The construction phase of the total life of a major steel bridge will probably be much more hazardous than the service-use phase. Experience shows that a large bridge is more likely to suffer failure during erection than after completion. Many decades ago, steel bridge design engineering had progressed to the stage where the chance of structural failure under service loadings became altogether remote. However, the erection phase for a large bridge is inherently less secure, primarily because of the prospect of inadequacies in construction engineering and its implementation at the job site. The hazards associated with the erection of large steel bridges will be readily apparent from a review of the illustrations in this chapter.



Figure 45.1 Failure of a steel girder bridge during erection, 1995. Steel bridge failures such as this one invite suspicion that the construction engineering aspects were not properly attended to.

For significant steel bridges the key to construction integrity lies in the proper planning and engineering of steelwork fabrication and erection. Conversely, failure to attend properly to construction engineering constitutes an invitation to disaster. In fact, this thesis is so compelling that whenever a steel bridge failure occurs during construction (see for example [Figure 45.1](#)), it is reasonable to assume that the construction engineering investigation was either inadequate, not properly implemented, or both.

45.4 Premises and Objectives of Construction Engineering

During the erection sequences the various components of steel bridges may be subjected to stresses that are quite different from those which will occur under the service loadings and which have been provided for by the designer. For example, during construction there may be a derrick moving and working on the partially erected structure, and the structure may be cantilevered out some distance causing tension-designed members to be in compression and vice versa. Thus, the steelwork contractor needs to engineer the bridge members through their various construction loadings, and strengthen and stabilize them as may be necessary. Further, the contractor may need to provide temporary members to support and stabilize the structure as it passes through its successive erection configurations.

In addition to strength problems there are also geometric considerations. The steelwork contractor must engineer the construction sequences step by step to ensure that the structure will fit properly together as erection progresses, and that the final or closing members can be moved into position and connected. Finally, of course, the steelwork contractor must carry out the engineering studies needed to ensure that the geometry and stressing of the completed structure under normal temperature will be in accordance with the requirements of the design plans and specifications.

45.5 Fabrication and Erection Information Shown on Design Plans

Regrettably, the level of engineering effort required to accomplish safe and efficient fabrication and erection of steelwork superstructures is not widely understood or appreciated in bridge design offices, nor indeed by many steelwork contractors. It is only infrequently that we find a proper level of capability and effort in the engineering of construction.

The design drawings for an important bridge will sometimes display an erection scheme, even though most designers are not experienced in the practice of erection engineering and usually expend only a minimum or even superficial effort on erection studies. The scheme portrayed may not be practical, or may not be suitable in respect to the bidder or contractor's equipment and experience. Accordingly, the bidder or contractor may be making a serious mistake if he relies on an erection scheme portrayed on the design plans.

As an example of misplaced erection effort on the part of the designer, there have been cases where the design plans show cantilever erection by deck travelers, with the permanent members strengthened correspondingly to accommodate the erection loadings; but the successful bidder elected to use waterborne erection derricks with long booms, thereby obviating the necessity for most or all of the erection strengthening provided on the design plans. Further, even in those cases where the contractor would decide to erect by cantilevering as anticipated on the plans, there is hardly any way for the design engineer to know what will be the weight and dimensions of the contractor's erection travelers.

45.6 Erection Feasibility

Of course, the bridge designer does have a certain responsibility to his client and to the public in respect to the erection of the bridge steelwork. This responsibility includes: (1) making certain, during the design stage, that there is a feasible and economical method to erect the steelwork; (2) setting forth in the contract documents any necessary erection guidelines and restrictions; and (3) reviewing the contractor's erection scheme, including any strengthening that may be needed, to verify its suitability. It may be noted that this latter review does not relieve the contractor from responsibility for the adequacy and safety of the field operations.

Bridge annals include a number of cases where the design engineer failed to consider erection feasibility. In one notable instance the design plans showed the 1200 ft (366 m) main span for a long crossing over a wide river as an esthetically pleasing steel tied-arch. However, erection of such a span in the middle of the river was impractical; one bidder found that the tonnage of falsework required was about the same as the weight of the permanent arch-span steelwork. Following opening of the bids, the owner found the prices quoted to be well beyond the resources available, and the tied-arch main span was discarded in favor of a through-cantilever structure, for which erection falsework needs were minimal and practical.

It may be noted that design engineers can stand clear of serious mistakes such as this one, by the simple expedient of conferring with prospective bidders during the preliminary design stage of a major bridge.

45.7 Illustrations of Challenges in Construction Engineering

Space does not permit comprehensive coverage of the numerous and difficult technical challenges that can confront the construction engineer in the course of the erection of various types of major steel bridges. However, some conception of the kinds of steelwork erection problems, the methods available to resolve them, and the hazards involved can be conveyed by views of bridges in various stages of erection; refer to the illustrations in the text.

45.8 Obstacles to Effective Construction Engineering

There is an unfortunate tendency among design engineers to view construction engineering as relatively unimportant. This view may be augmented by the fact that few designers have had any significant experience in the engineering of construction.

Further, managers in the construction industry must look critically at costs, and they can readily develop the attitude that their engineers are doing unnecessary theoretical studies and calculations, detached from the practical world. (And indeed, this may sometimes be the case.) Such management

apprehension can constitute a serious obstacle to staff engineers who see the need to have enough money in the bridge tender to cover a proper construction engineering effort for the project. There is the tendency for steelwork construction company management to cut back the construction engineering allowance, partly because of this apprehension and partly because of the concern that other tenderers will not be allotting adequate money for construction engineering. This effort is often thought of by company management as “a necessary evil” at best — something they would prefer not to be bothered with or burdened with.

Accordingly, construction engineering tends to be a difficult area of endeavor. The way for staff engineers to gain the confidence of management is obvious — they need to conduct their investigations to a level of technical proficiency that will command management respect and support, and they must keep management informed as to what they are doing and why it is necessary. As for management’s concern that other bridge tenderers will not be putting into their packages much money for construction engineering, this concern is no doubt often justified, and it is difficult to see how responsible steelwork contractors can cope with this problem.

45.9 Examples of Inadequate Construction Engineering Allowances and Effort

Even with the best of intentions, the bidder’s allocation of money to construction engineering can be inadequate. A case in point involved a very heavy, long-span cantilever truss bridge crossing a major river. The bridge superstructure carried a contract price of some \$30 million, including an allowance of \$150,000, or about one-half of 1%, for construction engineering of the permanent steelwork (i.e., not including such matters as design of erection equipment). As fabrication and erection progressed, many unanticipated technical problems came forward, including brittle-fracture aspects of certain grades of the high-strength structural steel, and aerodynamic instability of H-shaped vertical and diagonal truss members. In the end the contractor’s construction engineering effort mounted to about \$1.3 million, almost nine times the estimated cost.

Another significant example — this one in the domain of buildings — involved a design-and-construct project for airplane maintenance hangars at a prominent international airport. There were two large and complicated buildings, each 100×150 m (328×492 ft) in plan and 37 m (121 ft) high with a 10 m (33 ft) deep space-frame roof. Each building contained about 2450 tons of structural steelwork. The design-and-construct steelwork contractor had submitted a bid of about \$30 million, and included therein was the magnificent sum of \$5,000 for construction engineering, under the expectation that this work could be done on an incidental basis by the project engineer in his “spare time.”

As the steelwork contract went forward it quickly became obvious that the construction engineering effort had been grossly underestimated. The contractor proceeded to staff-up appropriately and carried out in-depth studies, leading to a detailed erection procedure manual of some 270 pages showing such matters as erection equipment and its positioning and clearances; falsework requirements; lifting tackle and jacking facilities; stress, stability, and geometric studies for gravity and wind loads; step-by-step instructions for raising, entering, and connecting the steelwork components; closing and swinging the roof structure and portal frame; and welding guidelines and procedures. This erection procedure manual turned out to be a key factor in the success of the fieldwork. The cost of this construction engineering effort amounted to about ten times the estimate, but still came to a mere one-fifth of 1% of the total contract cost.

In yet another example a major steelwork general contractor was induced to sublet the erection of a long-span cantilever truss bridge to a reputable erection contractor, whose quoted *price* for the work was less than the general contractor’s estimated *cost*. During the erection cycle the general contractor’s engineers made some visits to the job site to observe progress, and were surprised and disconcerted to observe how little erection engineering and planning had been accomplished. For example, the erector had made no provision for installing jacks in the bottom-chord jacking points for closure of the main

span; it was left up to the field forces to provide the jack bearing components inside the bottom-chord joints and to find the required jacks in the local market. When the job-built installations were tested it was discovered that they would not lift the cantilevered weight, and the job had to be shut down while the field engineer scouted around to find larger-capacity jacks. Further, certain compression members did not appear to be properly braced to carry the erection loadings; the erector had not engineered those members, but just assumed they were adequate. It became obvious that the erector had not appraised the bridge members for erection adequacy and had done little or no planning and engineering of the critical evolutions to be carried out in the field.

Many further examples of inadequate attention to construction engineering could be presented. Experience shows that the amounts of money and time allocated by steelwork contractors for the engineering of construction are frequently far less than desirable or necessary. Clearly, effort spent on construction engineering is worthwhile; it is obviously more efficient and cheaper, and certainly much safer, to plan and engineer steelwork construction in the office in advance of the work, rather than to leave these important matters for the field forces to work out. Just a few bad moves on site, with the corresponding waste of labor and equipment hours, will quickly use up sums of money much greater than those required for a proper construction engineering effort — not to mention the costs of any job accidents that might occur.

The obvious question is “Why is construction engineering not properly attended to?” Do not contractors learn, after a bad experience or two, that it is both necessary and cost effective to do a thorough job of planning and engineering the construction of important bridge projects? Experience and observation would seem to indicate that some steelwork contractors learn this lesson, while many do not. There is always pressure to reduce bid prices to the absolute minimum, and to add even a modest sum for construction engineering must inevitably reduce the prospect of being the low bidder.

45.10 Considerations Governing Construction Engineering Practices

There are no textbooks or manuals that define how to accomplish a proper job of construction engineering. In bridge construction (and no doubt in building construction as well) the engineering of construction tends to be a matter of each firm's experience, expertise, policies, and practices. Usually there is more than one way to build the structure, depending on the contractor's ingenuity and engineering skill, his risk appraisal and inclination to assume risk, the experience of his fabrication and erection work forces, his available equipment, and his personal preferences. Experience shows that each project is different; and although there will be similarities from one bridge of a given type to another, the construction engineering must be accomplished on an individual project basis. Many aspects of the project at hand will turn out to be different from those of previous similar jobs, and also there may be new engineering considerations and requirements for a given project that did not come forward on previous similar work.

During the estimating and bidding phase of the project the prudent, experienced bridge steelwork contractor will “start from scratch” and perform his own fabrication and erection studies, irrespective of any erection schemes and information that may be shown on the design plans. These studies can involve a considerable expenditure of both time and money, and thereby place that contractor at a disadvantage in respect to those bidders who are willing to rely on hasty, superficial studies, or — where the design engineer has shown an erection scheme — to simply assume that it has been engineered correctly and proceed to use it. The responsible contractor, on the other hand, will appraise the feasible construction methods and evaluate their costs and risks, and then make his selection.

After the contract has been executed the contractor will set forth how he intends to fabricate and erect, in detailed plans that could involve a large number of calculation sheets and drawings along with construction procedure documents. It is appropriate for the design engineer on behalf of his client to review the contractor's plans carefully, perform a check of construction considerations, and raise appro-

priate questions. Where the contractor does not agree with the designer's comments the two parties get together for review and discussion, and in the end they concur on essential factors such as fabrication and erection procedures and sequences, the weight and positioning of erection equipment, the design of falsework and other temporary components, erection stressing and strengthening of the permanent steelwork, erection stability and bracing of critical components, any erection check measurements that may be needed, and span closing and swinging operations.

The design engineer's approval is needed for certain fabrication plans, such as the cambering of individual members; however, in most cases the designer should stand clear of actual *approval* of the contractor's construction plans since he is not in a position to accept construction responsibility, and too many things can happen during the field evolutions over which the designer has no control.

It should be emphasized that even though the design engineer has usually has no significant experience in steelwork construction, the contractor should welcome his comments and evaluate them carefully and respectfully. In major bridge projects many construction matters can be improved on or get out of control or can be improved upon, and the contractor should take advantage of every opportunity to improve his prospects and performance. The experienced contractor will make sure that he works constructively with the design engineer, standing well clear of antagonistic or confrontational posturing.

45.11 Camber Considerations

One of the first construction engineering problems to be resolved by the steel bridge contractor is the cambering of individual bridge components. The design plans will show the "geometric outline" of the bridge, which is its shape under the designated load condition — commonly full dead load — at normal temperature. The contractor, however, fabricates the bridge members under the no-load condition, and at the "shop temperature" — the temperature at which the shop measuring tapes have been standardized and will have the correct length. The difference between the shape of a member under full dead load and normal temperature, and its shape at the no-load condition and shop temperature, is defined as member camber.

While camber is inherently a simple concept, it is frequently misunderstood; indeed, it is often not correctly defined in design specifications and contract documents. For example, beam and girder camber has been defined in specifications as "the convexity induced into a member to provide for vertical curvature of grade and to offset the anticipated deflections indicated on the plans when the member is in its erected position in the structure. Cambers shall be measured in this erected position..." This definition is not correct, and reflects a common misunderstanding of a key structural engineering term. Camber of bending members is not convexity, nor does it have anything to do with grade vertical curvature, nor is it measured with the member in the erected position. Camber — of a bending member, or any other member — is the *difference in shape* of the member under its no-load fabrication outline as compared with its geometric outline; and it is "measured" — i.e., the cambered dimensions are applied to the member — not when it is in the *erected* position (whatever that might be), but rather, when it is in the *no-load* condition.

In summary, camber is a *difference* in shape and not the shape itself. Beams and girders are commonly cambered to compensate for deadload bending, and truss members to compensate for deadload axial force. However, further refinements can be introduced as may be needed; for example, the arch-rib box members of the Lewiston-Queenston bridge (Fig. 45.4) were cambered to compensate for deadload axial force, bending, and shear.

A further common misunderstanding regarding cambering of bridge members involves the effect of the erection scheme on cambers. The erection scheme may require certain members to be strengthened, and this in turn will affect the cambers of those members (and possibly of others as well, in the case of statically indeterminate structures). However, the fabricator should address the matter of cambering only after the final sizes of all bridge members have been determined. Camber is a function of member properties, and there is no merit to calculating camber for members whose cross-sectional areas may subsequently be increased because of erection forces.

Thus, the erection scheme may affect the required member properties, and these in turn will affect member cambering; but the erection scheme does not *of itself* have any effect on camber. Obviously, the temporary stress-and-strain maneuvers to which a member will be subjected, between its no-load condition in the shop and its full-deadload condition in the completed structure, can have no bearing on the camber calculations for the member.

To illustrate the general principles that govern the cambering procedure, consider the main trusses of a truss bridge. The first step is to determine the erection procedure to be used, and to augment the strength of the truss members as may be necessary to sustain the erection forces. Next, the bridge deadload weights are determined, and the member deadload forces and effective cross-sectional areas are calculated.

Consider now a truss chord member having a geometric length of 49.1921 ft panel-point-to-panel-point and an effective cross-sectional area of 344.5 in.², carrying a deadload compressive force of 4230 kips. The bridge normal temperature is 45F and the shop temperature is 68F. We proceed as follows:

1. Assume that the chord member is in place in the bridge, at the full dead load of -4230 kips and the normal temperature of 45F.
2. Remove the member from the bridge, allowing its compressive force to fall to zero. The member will increase in length by an amount ΔL_s :

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta L_s &= \frac{SL}{AE} = \frac{4230 \text{ kips} \times 49.1921 \text{ ft}}{344.5 \text{ in}^2 \times 29000 \text{ kips/in}^2} \\ &= 0.0208 \text{ ft}\end{aligned}$$

3. Now raise the member temperature from 45F to 68F. The member will increase in length by an additional amount ΔL_t :

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta L_t &= L\omega t = (49.1921 + 0.0208) \text{ ft} \times \\ &\quad 0.0000065 / \text{deg} \times (68 - 45) \text{ deg} \\ &= 0.0074 \text{ ft}\end{aligned}$$

4. The total increase in member length will be:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta L &= \Delta L_s + \Delta L_t = 0.0208 + 0.0074 \\ &= 0.0282 \text{ ft}\end{aligned}$$

5. The theoretical cambered member length — the no-load length at 68F — will be:

$$L_{tc} = 49.1921 + 0.0282 = 49.2203 \text{ ft}$$

6. Rounding L_{tc} to the nearest 1/32 in., we obtain the cambered member length for fabrication as:

$$L_{fc} = 49 \text{ ft } 2\frac{21}{32} \text{ in}$$

Accordingly, the general procedure for cambering a bridge member of any type can be summarized as follows:

1. Strengthen the structure to accommodate erection forces, as may be needed.

2. Determine the bridge deadload weights, and the corresponding member deadload forces and effective cross-sectional areas.
3. Starting with the structure in its geometric outline, remove the member to be cambered.
4. Allow the deadload force in the member to fall to zero, thereby changing its shape to that corresponding to the no-load condition.
5. Further change the shape of the member to correspond to that at the shop temperature.
6. Accomplish any rounding of member dimensions that may be needed for practical purposes.
7. The total change of shape of the member — from geometric (at normal temperature) to no-load at shop temperature — constitutes the member camber.

It should be noted that the gusset plates for bridge-truss joints are always fabricated with the connecting-member axes coming in at their *geometric* angles. As the members are erected and the joints fitted-up, secondary bending moments will be induced at the truss joints under the steel-load-only condition; but these secondary moments will disappear when the bridge reaches its full-deadload condition.

45.12 Two General Approaches to Fabrication and Erection of Bridge Steelwork

As has been stated previously, the objective in steel bridge construction is to fabricate and erect the structure so that it will have the geometry and stressing designated on the design plans, under full deadload at normal temperature. This geometry is known as the geometric outline. In the case of steel bridges there have been, over the decades, two general procedures for achieving this objective:

1. The “field adjustment” procedure — Carry out a continuing program of steelwork surveys and measurements in the field as erection progresses, in an attempt to discover fabrication and erection deficiencies; and perform continuing steelwork adjustments in an effort to compensate for such deficiencies and for errors in span baselines and pier elevations.
2. The “shop control” procedure — Place total reliance on first-order surveying of span baselines and pier elevations, and on accurate steelwork fabrication and erection augmented by meticulous construction engineering; and proceed with erection without any field adjustments, on the basis that the resulting bridge deadload geometry and stressing will be as good as can possibly be achieved.

Bridge designers have a strong tendency to overestimate the capability of field forces to accomplish accurate measurements and effective adjustments of the partially erected structure, and at the same time they tend to underestimate the positive effects of precise steel bridgework fabrication and erection. As a result, we continue to find contract drawings for major steel bridges that call for field evolutions such as the following:

1. Continuous trusses and girders — At the designated stages, measure or “weigh” the reactions on each pier, compare them with calculated theoretical values, and add or remove bearing-shoe shims to bring measured values into agreement with calculated values.
2. Arch bridges — With the arch ribs erected to midspan and only the short, closing “crown sections” not yet in place, measure thrust and moment at the crown, compare them with calculated theoretical values, and then adjust the shape of the closing sections to correct for errors in span-length measurements and in bearing-surface angles at skewback supports, along with accumulated fabrication and erection errors.
3. Suspension bridges — Following erection of the first cable wire or strand across the spans from anchorage to anchorage, survey its sag in each span and adjust these sags to agree with calculated theoretical values.
4. Arch bridges and suspension bridges — Carry out a deck-profile survey along each side of the bridge under the steel-load-only condition, compare survey results with the theoretical profile,



Figure 45.2 Erection of arch ribs, Rainbow Bridge, Niagara Falls, New York, 1941. Bridge span is 950 ft (290 m), with rise of 150 ft 46 m); box ribs are 3×12 ft (0.91×3.66 m). Tiebacks were attached starting at the end of the third tier and jumped forward as erection progressed (see Figure 45.3). Much permanent steelwork was used in tieback bents. Derricks on approaches load steelwork onto material cars that travel up arch ribs. Travelers are shown erecting last full-length arch-rib sections, leaving only the short, closing crown sections to be erected. Canada is at right, the U.S. at left. (Courtesy of Bethlehem Steel Corporation.)

and shim the suspender sockets so as to render the bridge floorbeams level in the completed structure.

5. Cable-stayed bridges — At each deck-steelwork erection stage, adjust tensions in the newly erected cable stays so as to bring the surveyed deck profile and measured stay tensions into agreement with calculated theoretical data.

There are two prime obstacles to the success of “field adjustment” procedures of whatever type: (1) field determination of the actual geometric and stress conditions of the partially erected structure and its components will not necessarily be definitive, and (2) calculation of the corresponding “proper” or “target” theoretical geometric and stress conditions will most likely prove to be less than authoritative.

45.13 Example of Arch Bridge Construction

In the case of the arch bridge closing sections referred to heretofore, experience on the construction of two major fixed-arch bridges crossing the Niagara River gorge from the U.S. to Canada — the Rainbow and the Lewiston-Queenston arch bridges (see Figures 45.2 through 45.5) — has demonstrated the difficulty, and indeed the futility, of attempts to make field-measured geometric and stress conditions agree with calculated theoretical values. The broad intent for both structures was to make such adjustments in the shape of the arch-rib closing sections at the crown (which were nominally about 1ft [0.3m] long) as would bring the arch-rib actual crown moments and thrusts into agreement with the calculated theoretical values, thereby correcting for errors in span-length measurements, errors in bearing-surface angles at the skewback supports, and errors in fabrication and erection of the arch-rib sections.




Figure 45.3 Rainbow Bridge, Niagara Falls, New York, showing successive arch tieback positions. Arch-rib erection geometry and stressing were controlled by means of measured tieback tensions in combination with surveyed arch-rib elevations.



Figure 45.4 Lewiston-Queenston arch bridge, near Niagara Falls, New York, 1962. The longest fixed-arch span in the U.S. at 1000 ft (305 m); rise is 159 ft (48 m). Box arch-rib sections are typically about $3 \times 13\text{-}1/2$ ft (0.9×4.1 m) in cross-section and about $44\text{-}1/2$ ft (13.6 m) long. Job was estimated using erection tiebacks (same as shown in [Figure 45.3](#)), but subsequent studies showed the long, sloping falsework bents to be more economical (even if less secure looking). Much permanent steelwork was used in the falsework bents. Derricks on approaches load steelwork onto material cars that travel up arch ribs. The 115-ton-capacity travelers are shown erecting the last full-length arch-rib sections, leaving only the short, closing crown sections to be erected. Canada is at left, the U.S. at right. (Courtesy of Bethlehem Steel Corporation.)

Following extensive theoretical investigations and on-site measurements the steelwork contractor found, in the case of each Niagara arch bridge, that there were large percentage differences between the field-measured and the calculated theoretical values of arch-rib thrust, moment, and line-of-thrust position, and that the measurements could not be interpreted so as to indicate what corrections to the theoretical closing crown sections, if any, should be made. Accordingly, the contractor concluded that the best solution in each case was to abandon any attempts at correction and simply install the theoretical-shape closing crown sections. In each case, the contractor's recommendation was accepted by the design engineer.

Points to be noted in respect to these field-closure evolutions for the two long-span arch bridges are that accurate jack-load closure measurements at the crown are difficult to obtain under field conditions; and calculation of corresponding theoretical crown thrusts and moments are likely to be questionable because of uncertainties in the dead loading, in the weights of erection equipment, and in the steelwork temperature. Therefore, attempts to adjust the shape of the closing crown sections so as to bring the actual stress condition of the arch ribs closer to the presumed theoretical condition are not likely to be either practical or successful.

It was concluded that for long, flexible arch ribs, the best construction philosophy and practice is (1) to achieve overall geometric control of the structure by performing all field survey work and steelwork fabrication and erection operations to a meticulous degree of accuracy, and then (2) to rely on that overall geometric control to produce a finished structure having the desired stressing and geometry. For the Rainbow arch bridge, these practical construction considerations were set forth definitively by the contractor in [\[2\]](#). The contractor's experience for the Lewiston-Queenston arch bridge was similar to that on Rainbow, and was reported — although in considerably less detail — in [\[10\]](#).




Figure 45.5 Lewiston-Queenston arch bridge near Niagara Falls, New York. Crawler cranes erect steelwork for spans 1 and 6 and erect material derricks thereon. These derricks erect traveler derricks, which move forward and erect supporting falsework and spans 2, 5, and 4. Traveler derricks erect arch-rib sections 1 and 2 and supporting falsework at each skewback, then set up creeper derricks, which erect arches to midspan.

45.14 Which Construction Procedure Is To Be Preferred?

The contractor's experience on the construction of the two long-span fixed-arch bridges is set forth at length since it illustrates a key construction theorem that is broadly applicable to the fabrication and erection of steel bridges of all types. This theorem holds that the contractor's best procedure for achieving, in the completed structure, the deadload geometry and stressing stipulated on the design plans, is generally as follows:

1. Determine deadload stress data for the structure at its geometric outline (under normal temperature), based on accurately calculated weights for all components.
2. Determine the cambered (i.e., "no-load") dimensions of each component. This involves determining the change of shape of each component from the deadload geometry, as its deadload stressing is removed and its temperature is changed from normal to the shop temperature. (Refer to Section 45.11)
3. Fabricate, with all due precision, each structural component to its proper no-load dimensions — except for certain flexible components such as wire rope and strand members, which may require special treatment.
4. Accomplish shop assembly of members and "reaming assembled" of holes in joints, as needed.
5. Carry out comprehensive engineering studies of the structure under erection at each key erection stage, determining corresponding stress and geometric data, and prepare a step-by-step erection procedure plan, incorporating any check measurements that may be necessary or desirable.
6. During the erection program, bring all members and joints to the designated alignment prior to bolting or welding.
7. Enter and connect the final or closing structural components, following the closing procedure plan, without attempting any field measurements thereof or adjustments thereto.

In summary, the key to construction success is to accomplish the field surveys of critical baselines and support elevations with all due precision, perform construction engineering studies comprehensively and shop fabrication accurately, and then carry the erection evolutions through in the field without any second guessing and ill-advised attempts at measurement and adjustment.

It may be noted that no special treatment is accorded to statically indeterminate members; they are fabricated and erected under the same governing considerations applicable to statically determinate members, as set forth above. It may be noted further that this general steel bridge construction philosophy does not rule out check measurements altogether, as erection goes forward; under certain special conditions, measurements of stressing and/or geometry at critical erection stages may be necessary or desirable in order to confirm structural integrity. However, before the erector calls for any such measurements he should make certain that they will prove to be practical and meaningful.

45.15 Example of Suspension Bridge Cable Construction

In order to illustrate the "shop control" construction philosophy further, its application to the main cables of the first Wm. Preston Lane, Jr., Memorial Bridge, crossing the Chesapeake Bay in Maryland, completed in 1952 (Figure 45.6), will be described. Suspension bridge cables constitute one of the most difficult bridge erection challenges. Up until "first Chesapeake" the cables of major suspension bridges had been adjusted to the correct position in each span by means of a sag survey of the first-erected cable wires or strands, using surveying instruments and target rods. However, on first Chesapeake, with its 1600 ft (488 m) main span, 661 ft (201 m) side spans, and 450 ft (137 m) back spans, the steelwork contractor recommended abandoning the standard cable-sag survey and adopting the "setting-to-mark" procedure for positioning the guide strands — a significant new concept in suspension bridge cable construction.

The steelwork contractor's rationale for "setting to marks" was spelled out in a letter to the design engineer (see Figure 45.7). (The complete letter is reproduced because it spells out significant construction



Figure 45.6 Suspension spans of first Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Maryland, 1952. Deck steelwork is under erection and is about 50% complete. A typical four-panel through-truss deck section, weighing about 100 tons, is being picked in west side span, and also in east side span in distance. Main span is 1600 ft (488 m) and side spans are 661 ft (201 m); towers are 324 ft (99 m) high. Cables are 14 in. (356 mm) in diameter and are made up of 61 helical bridge strands each (see [Figure 45.8](#)).

philosophies.) This innovation was accepted by the design engineer. It should be noted that the contractor's major argument was that setting to marks would lead to more accurate cable placement than would a sag survey. The minor arguments, alluded to in the letter, were the resulting savings in preparatory office engineering work and in the field engineering effort, and most likely in construction time as well.

Each cable consisted of 61 standard helical-type bridge strands, as shown in [Figure 45.8](#). To implement the setting-to-mark procedure each of three bottom-layer "guide strands" of each cable (i.e., strands 1, 2, and 3) was accurately measured in the manufacturing shop under the simulated full-deadload tension, and circumferential marks were placed at the four center-of-saddle positions of each strand. Then, in the field, the guide strands (each about 3955 ft [1205 m] long) were erected and positioned according to the following procedure:

1. Place the three guide strands for each cable "on the mark" at each of the four saddles and set normal shims at each of the two anchorages.
2. Under conditions of uniform temperature and no wind, measure the sag differences among the three guide strands of each cable, at the center of each of the five spans.
3. Calculate the "center-of-gravity" position for each guide-strand group in each span.
4. Adjust the sag of each strand to bring it to the center-of-gravity position in each span. This position was considered to represent the correct theoretical guide-strand sag in each span.

The maximum "spread" from the highest to the lowest strand at the span center, prior to adjustment, was found to be 1-3/4 in (44 mm) in the main span, 3-1/2 in. (89 mm) in the side spans, and 3-3/4 in (95 mm) in the back spans. Further, the maximum change of perpendicular sag needed to bring the guide strands to the center-of-gravity position in each span was found to be 15/16 in (24 mm) for the main span, 2-1/16 in (52 mm) for the side spans, and 2-1/16 in (52 mm) for the back spans. These small adjustments testify to the accuracy of strand fabrication and to the validity of the setting-to-mark strand adjustment procedure, which was declared to be a success by all parties concerned. It seems doubtful that such accuracy in cable positioning could have been achieved using the standard sag-survey procedure.

With the first-layer strands in proper position in each cable, the strands in the second and subsequent layers were positioned to hang correctly in relation to the first layer, as is customary and proper for suspension bridge cable construction.

This example provides good illustration that the construction engineering philosophy referred to as the shop-control procedure can be applied advantageously not only to typical rigid-type steel structures, such as continuous trusses and arches, but also to flexible-type structures, such as suspension bridges.

July 6th, 1951

JJ:MM

C-1756

[To the design engineer]

Gentlemen: Attention of Mr. _____
Re: Chesapeake Bay Bridge — Suspension Span Cables

In our studies of the method of cable erection, we have arrived at the conclusion that setting of the guide strands to measured marks, instead of to surveyed sag, is a more satisfactory and more accurate method. Since such a procedure is not in accordance with the specifications, we wish to present for your consideration the reasoning which has led us to this conclusion, and to describe in outline form our proposed method of setting to marks.

On previous major suspension bridges, most of which have been built with parallel-wire instead of helical-strand cables, the thought has evidently been that setting the guide wire or guide strand to a computed sag, varying with the temperature, would be the most accurate method. This is associated with the fact that guide wires were never measured and marked to length. These established methods were carried over when strand-type cables came into use. An added reason may have been the knowledge that a small error in length results in a relatively large error in sag; and on the present structure the length-error to sag-error ratios are 1:2.4 and 1:1.5 for the main span and side spans, respectively.

However, the reading of the sag in the field is a very difficult operation because of the distances involved, the slopes of the side spans and backstays, the fact that even slight wind causes considerable motion to the guide strand, and for other practical reasons. We also believe that even though readings are made on cloudy days or at night, the actual temperature of all portions of the structure which will affect the sag cannot be accurately known. We are convinced that setting the guide strands according to the length marks thereon, which are placed under what amount to laboratory or ideal conditions at the manufacturing plant, will produce more accurate results than would field measurement of the sag.

To be specific, consider the case of field determination of sag in the main span, where it is necessary to establish accessible platforms, and an H.I. and a foresight somewhat below the desired sag elevation; and then to sight on the foresight and bring a target, hung from the guide strand, down to the line-of-sight. In the present case it is 1600 ft (488 m) to the foresight and 800 ft (244 m) to the target. Even if the line-of-sight were established just right, it would be only under perfect conditions of temperature and air — if indeed then — that such a survey would be precise. The difficulties are still greater in the side spans and back spans, where inclined lines-of-sight must be established by a series of offset measurements from distant bench marks. There is always the danger, particularly in the present location and at the time now scheduled, that days may be lost in waiting for the right conditions of weather to make an instrument survey feasible.

There is a second factor of doubt involved. The strand is measured under a known stress and at a known modulus, with “mechanical stretch” taken out. It is then reeled to a relatively small diameter and unreel at the bridge site. Under its own weight, and until the full dead load has been applied, there is an indeterminable loss in mechanical set, or loss of modulus. A strand set to proper sag for the final modulus will accordingly be set too low, and the final cable will be below plan elevation. This possible error can only be on the side that is less desirable. Evidently, also, it could be on the order of 1-1/2 in (40 mm) of sag increase for 1% of temporary reduction in modulus. If the strand were set to sag based on the assumed smaller modulus than will exist for the fully loaded condition, we doubt whether this smaller modulus could be chosen closely enough to ensure that the final sag would be correct. We are assured, however, by our manufacturing plant, that even though the modulus under bare-cable weight may be subject to unknown variation, the modulus which existed at the pre-stressing bed under the measuring tension will be duplicated when this same tension is

Figure 45.7 Setting cable guide strands to marks.

reached under dead load. Therefore, if the guide stand is set to measured marks, the doubt as to modulus is eliminated.

A third source of error is temperature. In past practice the sag has been adjusted, by reference to a chart, in accordance with the existing temperature. Granted that the adjustment is made in the early morning (the fog having risen but the sun not), it is hard to conceive that the actual average temperature in 3955 ft (1205 m) of strand will be that recorded by any thermometer. The mainspan sag error is about 0.7 in. (18 mm) per deg C of temperature.

These conditions are all greatly improved at the strand pre-stressing bed. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the guide strands can be measured and marked to an insignificant degree of error, at a stipulated stress and under a well-soaked and determinable temperature. Any errors in sag level must result from something other than the measured length of the guide strand.

There is one indispensable condition which, however, holds for either method of setting. That is, that the total distance from anchorage to anchorage, and the total calculated length of strand under its own-weight stress, must agree within the limits of shimming provided in the anchorages. Therefore, this distance in the field must be checked to close agreement. While the measured length of strand will be calculated with precision, it is interesting to note that in this calculation, it is not essential that the modulus be known with exactness. The important factor is that the strand length under the final deadload stress will be calculated exactly; and since that length is measured under the corresponding average strand stress, knowledge of the modulus is not a consideration. If the modulus at deadload stress is not as assumed, the only effect will be a change of deflection under live load, and this is minor. We emphasize again that the stand length under dead load, and the length as measured in the prestressing bed, will be identical regardless of the modulus.

The calculations for the bare-cable position result in pulled-back positions for the tops of the towers and cable bents, in order to control the unbalanced forces tending to slip the strands in the saddles. These pullback distances may be slightly in error without the slipping forces overcoming friction and thereby becoming apparent. Such errors would affect the final sags of strands set to sag. However, they would have no effect on the final sags of strands set-to-mark at the saddles; these errors change the temporary strand sags only, and under final stress the sags and the shaft leans will be as called for by the design plans.

It sometimes has happened that a tower which at its base is square to the bridge axis, acquires a slight skew as it rises. The amount of this skew has never, so far as we know, been important. If it is disregarded and the guide strands are attached without any compensating change, then the final loading will, with virtual certainty, pull the tower square. All sources of possible maladjustment have now been discussed except one — the errors in the several span lengths at the base of the towers and bents. The intention is to recognize and accept these, by performing the appropriate check measurements; and to correct for them by slipping the guide strands designated amounts through the saddles such that the center-of-saddle mark on the strand will be offset by that same amount from the centerline of the saddle.

If we have left unexplained herein any factor that seems to you to render our procedure questionable, we are anxious to know of it and discuss it with you in the near future; and we will be glad to come to your offices for this purpose. The detailed preparations for observing strand sags would require considerable time, and we are not now doing any work along those lines.

Yours very truly,
Chief Engineer

Figure 45.7 (Continued) Setting cable guide strands to marks.




Figure 45.8 Main cable of first Chesapeake Bay suspension bridge, Maryland. Each cable consists of 61 helical-type bridge strands, 55 of 1-11/16 in (43 mm) and 6 of 29/32 in. (23 mm) diameter. Strands 1, 2, and 3 were designated "guide strands" and were set to mark at each saddle and to normal shims at anchorages.

There is, however, an important caveat: the steelwork contractor must be a firm of suitable caliber and experience.

45.16 Example of Cable-Stayed Bridge Construction

In the case cable-stayed bridges, the first of which were built in the 1950s, it appears that the governing construction engineering philosophy calls for field measurement and adjustment as the means for control of stay-cable and deck-structure geometry and stressing. For example, we have seen specifications calling for the completed bridge to meet the following geometric and stress requirements:

1. The deck elevation at midspan shall be within 12 in (305 mm) of theoretical.
2. The deck profile at each cable attachment point shall be within 2 in (50mm) of a parabola passing through the actual (i.e., field-measured) midspan point.
3. Cable-stay tensions shall be within 5% of the "corrected theoretical" values.

Such specification requirements introduce a number of problems of interpretation, field measurement, calculation, and field correction procedure, such as the following:

1. Interpretation:
 - The specifications are silent with respect to transverse elevation differentials. Therefore, two deck-profile control parabolas are presumably needed, one for each side of the bridge.
2. Field measurement of actual deck profile:
 - The temperature will be neither constant nor uniform throughout the structure during the survey work.

- The survey procedure itself will introduce some inherent error.
3. Field measurement of cable-stay tensions:
 - Hydraulic jacks, if used, are not likely to be accurate within 2%, perhaps even 5%; further, the exact point of “lift off” will be uncertain.
 - Other procedures for measuring cable tension, such as vibration or strain gaging, do not appear to define tensions within about 5%.
 - All cable tensions cannot be measured simultaneously; an extended period will be needed, during which conditions will vary and introduce additional errors.
 4. Calculation of “actual” bridge profile and cable tensions:
 - Field-measured data must be transformed by calculation into “corrected actual” bridge profiles and cable tensions, at normal temperature and without erection loads.
 - Actual dead weights of structural components can differ by perhaps 2% from nominal weights, while temporary erection loads probably cannot be known within about 5%.
 - The actual temperature of structural components will be uncertain and not uniform.
 - The mathematical model itself will introduce additional error.
 5. “Target condition” of bridge:
 - The “target condition” to be achieved by field adjustment will differ from the geometric condition, because of the absence of the deck wearing surface and other such components; it must therefore be calculated, introducing additional error.
 6. Determining field corrections to be carried out by erector, to transform “corrected actual” bridge into “target condition” bridge:
 - The bridge structure is highly redundant, and changing any one cable tension will send geometric and cable-tension changes throughout the structure. Thus, an iterative correction procedure will be needed.

It seems likely that the total effect of all these practical factors could easily be sufficient to render ineffective the contractor’s attempts to fine tune the geometry and stressing of the as-erected structure in order to bring it into agreement with the calculated bridge target condition. Further, there can be no assurance that the specifications requirements for the deck-profile geometry and cable-stay tensions are even compatible; it seems likely that *either* the deck geometry *or* the cable tensions may be achieved, but not *both*.

Specifications clauses of the type cited seem clearly to constitute unwarranted and unnecessary field-adjustment requirements. Such clauses are typically set forth by bridge designers who have great confidence in computer-generated calculation, but do not have a sufficient background in and understanding of the practical factors associated with steel bridge construction. Experience has shown that field procedures for major bridges developed unilaterally by design engineers should be reviewed carefully to determine whether they are practical and desirable and will in fact achieve the desired objectives.

In view of all these considerations, the question comes forward as to what design and construction principles should be followed to ensure that the deadload geometry and stressing of steel cable-stayed bridges will fall within acceptable limits. Consistent with the general construction-engineering procedures recommended for other types of bridges, we should abandon reliance on field measurements followed by adjustments of geometry and stressing, and instead place prime reliance on proper geometric control of bridge components during fabrication, followed by accurate erection evolutions as the work goes forward in the field.

Accordingly, the proper construction procedure for cable-stayed steel bridges can be summarized as follows:

1. Determine the actual bridge baseline lengths and pier-top elevations to a high degree of accuracy.
2. Fabricate the bridge towers, cables, and girders to a high degree of geometric precision.
3. Determine, in the fabricating shop, the final residual errors in critical fabricated dimensions, including cable-stay lengths after socketing, and positions of socket bearing surfaces or pinholes.
4. Determine “corrected theoretical” positioning for each individual cable stay.
5. During erection, bring all tower and girder structural joints into shop-fabricated alignment, with fair holes, etc.
6. At the appropriate erection stages, install “corrected theoretical” positional for each cable stay.
7. With the structure in the all-steel-erected condition (or other appropriate designated condition), check it over carefully to determine whether any significant geometric or other discrepancies are in evidence. If there are none, declare conditions acceptable and continue with erection.

This construction engineering philosophy can be summarized by stating that if the steelwork fabrication and erection are properly engineered and carried out, the geometry and stressing of the completed structure will fall within acceptable limits; whereas, if the fabrication and erection are not properly done, corrective measurements and adjustments attempted in the field are not likely to improve the structure, or even to prove satisfactory. Accordingly, in constructing steel cable-stayed bridges we should place full reliance on accurate shop fabrication and on controlled field erection, just as is done on other types of steel bridges, rather than attempting to make measurements and adjustments in the field to compensate for inadequate fabrication and erection.

45.17 Field Checking at Critical Erection Stages

As has been stated previously, the best governing procedure for steel bridge construction is generally the shop control procedure, wherein full reliance is placed on accurate fabrication of the bridge components as the basis for the integrity of the completed structure. However, this philosophy does not rule out the desirability of certain checks in the field as erection goes forward, with the objective of providing assurance that the work is on target and no significant errors have been introduced.

It would be impossible to catalog those cases during steel bridge construction where a field check might be desirable; such cases will generally suggest themselves as the construction engineering studies progress. We will only comment that these field-check cases, and the procedures to be used, should be looked at carefully, and even skeptically, to make certain that the measurements will be both desirable and practical, producing meaningful information that can be used to augment job integrity.

45.18 Determination of Erection Strength Adequacy

Quite commonly, bridge member forces during the erection stages will be altogether different from those that will prevail in the completed structure. At each critical erection stage the bridge members must be reviewed for strength and stability, to ensure structural integrity as the work goes forward. Such a construction engineering review is typically the responsibility of the steelwork erector, who carries out thorough erection studies of the structure and calls for strengthening or stabilizing of members as needed. The erector submits the studies and recommendations to the design engineer for review and comment, but normally the full responsibility for steelwork structural integrity during erection rests with the erector.

In the U.S., bridgework design specifications commonly require that stresses in steel structures under erection shall not exceed certain multiples of design allowable stresses. Although this type of erection stress limitation is probably safe for most steel structures under ordinary conditions, it is not necessarily adequate for the control of the erection stressing of large monumental-type bridges. The key point to be understood here is that fundamentally, there is no logical fixed relationship between design allowable stresses, which are based upon somewhat uncertain long-term service loading requirements along with some degree of assumed structural deterioration, and stresses that are safe and economical during the



Figure 45.9 Cable-stayed orthotropic-steel-deck bridge over Mississippi River at Luling, La., 1982; view looking northeast. The main span is 1222 ft (372 m); the A-frame towers are 350 ft (107 m) high. A barge-mounted ringer derrick erected the main steelwork, using a 340 ft (104 m) boom with a 120 ft (37 m) jib to erect tower components weighing up to 183 tons, and using a shorter boom for deck components. Cable stays at the ends of projecting cross girders are permanent; others are temporary erection stays. Girder section 16-west of north portion of bridge, erected a few days previously, is projecting at left; companion girder section 16-east is on barge ready for erection (see [Figure 45.10](#)).

bridge erection stages, where loads and their locations are normally well defined and the structural material is in new condition. Clearly, the basic premises of the two situations are significantly different, and “factored design stresses” must therefore be considered unreliable as a basis for evaluating erection safety.

There is yet a further problem with factored design stresses. Large truss-type bridges in various erection stages may undergo deflections and distortions that are substantial compared with those occurring under service conditions, thereby introducing apprehension regarding the effect of the secondary bending stresses that result from joint rigidity.

Recognizing these basic considerations, the engineering department of a major U.S. steelwork contractor went forward in the early 1970s to develop a logical philosophy for erection strength appraisal of large structural steel frameworks, with particular reference to long-span bridges, and implemented this philosophy with a stress analysis procedure. The effort was successful and the results were reported in a paper published by the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1977[6]. This stress analysis procedure, designated the erection rating factor (ERF) procedure, is founded directly upon basic structural principles, rather than on bridge-member design specifications, which are essentially irrelevant to the problem of erection stressing.

It may be noted that a significant inducement toward development of the ERF procedure was the failure of the first Quebec cantilever bridge in 1907 (see [Figures 45.11](#) and [45.12](#)). It was quite obvious that evaluation of the structural safety of the Quebec bridge at advanced cantilever erection stages such



Figure 45.10 Luling Bridge deck steelwork erection, 1982; view looking northeast (refer to [Figure 45.9](#)). The twin box girders are 14 ft (4.3 m) deep; the deck plate is 7/16 in. (11 mm) thick. Girder section 16-east is being raised into position (lower right) and will be secured by large-pin hinge bars prior to fairing-up of joint holes and permanent bolting. Temporary erection stays are jumped forward as girder erection progresses.

as that portrayed in [Figure 45.11](#), by means of the factored-design-stress procedure, would inspire no confidence and would not be justifiable.

The erection rating factor (ERF) procedure for a truss bridge can be summarized as follows:

1. Assume either (a) pin-ended members (no secondary bending), (b) plane-frame action (rigid truss joints, secondary bending in one plane), or (c) space-frame action (bracing-member joints also rigid, secondary bending in two planes), as engineering judgement dictates.
2. Determine, for each designated erection stage, the member primary forces (axial) and secondary forces (bending) attributable to gravity loads and wind loads.
3. Compute the member stresses induced by the combined erection axial forces and bending moments.
4. Compute the ERF for each member at three or five locations: at the middle of the member; at each joint, inside the gusset plates (usually at the first row of bolts); and, where upset member plates or gusset plates are used, at the stepped-down cross-section outside each joint.
5. Determine the minimum computed ERF for each member and compare it with the stipulated minimum value.
6. Where the computed minimum ERF equals or exceeds the stipulated minimum value, the member is considered satisfactory. Where it is less, the member may be inadequate; reevaluate the critical part of it in greater detail and recalculate the ERF for further comparison with the stipulated minimum. (Initially calculated values can often be increased significantly.)
7. Where the computed minimum ERF remains less than the stipulated minimum value, strengthen the member as required.

Note that member forces attributable to wind are treated the same as those attributable to gravity loads. The old concept of “increased allowable stresses” for wind is not considered to be valid for erection



Figure 45.11 First Quebec railway cantilever bridge, 23 August 1907. Cantilever erection of south main span, six days before collapse. The tower traveler erected the anchor span (on falsework) and then the cantilever arm; then erected the top-chord traveler, which is shown erecting suspended span at end of cantilever arm. The main span of 1800 ft (549 m) was the world's longest of any type. The sidespan bottom chords second from pier (arrow) failed in compression because latticing connecting chord corner angles was deficient under secondary bending conditions.

conditions and is not used in the ERF procedure. Maximum acceptable ℓ/r and b/t values are included in the criteria. ERFs for members subjected to secondary bending moments are calculated using interaction equations.

45.19 Philosophy of the Erection Rating Factor

In order that the structural integrity and reliability of a steel framework can be maintained throughout the erection program, the minimum probable (or “minimum characteristic”) strength value of each member must necessarily be no less than the maximum probable (or “maximum characteristic”) force value, under the most adverse erection condition. In other words, the following relationship is required:

$$S - \Delta S \geq F + \Delta F \quad (45.1)$$

where

- S = computed or nominal strength value for the member
- ΔS = maximum probable member strength underrun from the computed or nominal value
- F = computed or nominal force value for the member
- ΔF = maximum probable member force overrun from the computed or nominal value

Equation 45.1 states that in the event the actual strength of the structural member is less than the nominal strength, S , by an amount ΔS , while at same time the actual force in the member is greater than the nominal force, F , by an amount ΔF , the member strength will still be no less than the member force,



Figure 45.12 Wreckage of south anchor span of first Quebec railway cantilever bridge, 1907. View looking north from south shore a few days after collapse of 29 August 1907, the worst disaster in the history of bridge construction. About 20,000 tons of steelwork fell into the St. Lawrence River, and 75 workmen lost their lives.

and so the member will not fail during erection. This equation provides a direct appraisal of erection realities, in contrast to the allowable-stress approach based on factored design stresses.

Proceeding now to rearrange the terms in Equation 45.1, we find that

$$S\left(1 - \frac{\Delta S}{S}\right) \geq F\left(1 + \frac{\Delta F}{F}\right); \quad \frac{S}{F} \geq \frac{1 + \frac{\Delta F}{F}}{1 - \frac{\Delta S}{S}} \quad (45.2)$$

The ERF is now defined as

$$ERF \equiv \frac{S}{F} \quad (45.3)$$

that is, the nominal strength value, S , of the member divided by its nominal force value, F . Thus, for erection structural integrity and reliability to be maintained, it is necessary that

$$ERF \geq \frac{1 + \frac{\Delta F}{F}}{1 - \frac{\Delta S}{S}} \quad (45.4)$$

45.20 Minimum Erection Rating Factors

In view of possible errors in (1) the assumed weight of permanent structural components, (2) the assumed weight and positioning of erection equipment, and (3) the mathematical models assumed for purposes of erection structural analysis, it is reasonable to assume that the actual member force for a given erection condition may exceed the computed force value by as much as 10%; that is, it is reasonable to take $\Delta F/F$ as equal to 0.10.

For tension members, uncertainties in (1) the area of the cross-section, (2) the strength of the material, and (3) the member workmanship, indicate that the actual member strength may be up to 15% less than the computed value; that is, $\Delta S/S$ can reasonably be taken as equal to 0.15. The additional uncertainties associated with compression member strength suggest that $\Delta S/S$ be taken as 0.25 for those members. Placing these values into Equation 45.4, we obtain the following minimum ERFs:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Tension members: } \quad ERF_{t,\min} &= (1 + 0.10)/(1 - 0.15) \\ &= 1.294, \text{ say } 1.30\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Compression member: } \quad ERF_{c,\min} &= (1 + 0.10)/(1 - 0.25) \\ &= 1.467, \text{ say } 1.45\end{aligned}$$

The proper interpretation of these expressions is that if, for a given tension (compression) member, the ERF is calculated as 1.30 (1.45) or more, the member can be declared safe for the particular erection condition. Note that higher, or lower, values of erection rating factors may be selected if conditions warrant.

The minimum ERFs determined as indicated are based on experience and judgment, guided by analysis and test results. They do not reflect any specific probabilities of failure and thus are not based on the concept of an acceptable risk of failure, which might be considered the key to a totally rational approach to structural safety. This possible shortcoming in the ERF procedure might be at least partially overcome by evaluating the parameters $\Delta F/F$ and $\Delta S/S$ on a statistical basis; however, this would involve a considerable effort, and it might not even produce significant results.

It is important to recognize that the ERF procedure for determining erection strength adequacy is based directly on fundamental strength and stability criteria, rather than being only indirectly related to such criteria through the medium of a design specification. Thus, the procedure gives uniform results for the erection rating of framed structural members irrespective of the specification that was used to design the members. Obviously, the end use of the completed structure is irrelevant to its strength adequacy during the erection configurations, and therefore the design specification should not be brought into the picture as the basis for erection appraisal.

Experience with application of the ERF procedure to long-span truss bridges has shown that it places the erection engineer in much better contact with the physical significance of the analysis than can be obtained by using the factored-design-stress procedure. Further, the ERF procedure takes account of secondary stresses, which have generally been neglected in erection stress analysis.

Although the ERF procedure was prepared for application to truss bridge members, the simple governing structural principle set forth by Equation 45.1 could readily be applied to bridge members and components of any type.

45.21 Deficiencies of Typical Construction Procedure Drawings and Instructions

At this stage of the review it is appropriate to bring forward a key problem in the realm of bridge construction engineering: the strong tendency for construction procedure drawings to be insufficiently



Figure 45.13 Visiting the work site. It is of first-order importance for bridge construction engineers to visit the site regularly and confer with the job superintendent and his foremen regarding practical considerations. Construction engineers have much to learn from the work forces in shop and field, and vice versa. (Courtesy of Bethlehem Steel Corporation.)

clear, and for step-by-step instructions to be either lacking or less than definitive. As a result of these deficiencies it is not uncommon to find the contractor's shop and field evolutions to be going along under something less than suitable control.

Shop and field operations personnel who are in a position to speak frankly to construction engineers will sometimes let them know that procedure drawings and instructions often need to be clarified and upgraded. This is a pervasive problem, and it results from two prime causes: (1) the fabrication and erection engineers responsible for drawings and instructions do not have adequate on-the-job experience, and (2) they are not sufficiently skilled in the art of setting forth on the documents, clearly and concisely, exactly what is to be done by the operations forces — and, sometimes of equal importance, what *is not* to be done.

This matter of clear and concise construction procedure drawings and instructions may appear to be a pedestrian matter, but it is decidedly not. *It is a key issue of utmost importance to the success of steel bridge construction.*

45.22 Shop and Field Liaison by Construction Engineers

In addition to the need for well-prepared construction procedure drawings and instructions, it is essential for the staff engineers carrying out construction engineering to set up good working relations with the shop and field production forces, and to visit the work sites and establish effective communication with the personnel responsible for accomplishing what is shown on the documents.

Construction engineers should review each projected operation in detail with the work forces, and upgrade the procedure drawings and instructions as necessary, as the work goes forward. Further, engineers should be present at the work sites during critical stages of fabrication and erection. As a component of these site visits, the engineers should organize special meetings of key production personnel to go over critical operations in detail — complete with slides and blackboard as needed — thereby

providing the work forces with opportunities to ask questions and discuss procedures and potential problems, and providing engineers the opportunity to determine how well the work forces understand the operations to be carried out.

This matter of liaison between the office and the work sites — like the preceding issue of clear construction procedure documents — may appear to be somewhat prosaic; again, however, *it is a matter of paramount importance*. Failure to attend to these two key issues constitutes a serious problem in steel bridge construction, and opens the door to high costs and delays, and even to erection accidents.

45.23 Comprehensive Bridge Erection-Engineering Specifications

The erection rating factor (ERF) procedure for determination of erection strength adequacy, as set forth heretofore for bridge trusswork, could readily be extended to cover bridge members and components of any type under erection loading conditions. Bridge construction engineers should work toward this objective, in order to release erection strength appraisal from the limitations of the commonly used factored-design-stress procedure.

Looking still further ahead, it is apparent that there is need in the bridge engineering profession for comprehensive erection engineering specifications for steel bridge construction. Such specifications should include guidelines for such matters as devising and evaluating erection schemes, determining erection loads, evaluating erection strength adequacy of all types of bridge members and components, designing erection equipment, and designing temporary erection members such as falsework, tiedowns, tiebacks, and jacking struts. The specifications might also cover contractual considerations associated with construction engineering.

The key point to be recognized here is that the use of bridge *design* specifications as the basis for erection engineering studies, as is currently the custom, is not appropriate. Erection engineering is a related but different discipline, and should have its own specifications. However, given the current fragmented state of construction engineering in the U.S. (refer to Section 45.26), it is difficult to envision how such erection engineering specifications could be prepared. Proprietary considerations associated with each erection firm's experience and procedures could constitute an additional obstacle.

45.24 Standard Conditions for Contracting

A further basic problem in respect to the future of steel bridge construction in the U.S. lies in the absence of standard conditions for contracting.

On through the 19th century both the design and the construction of a major bridge in the U.S. were frequently the responsibility of a single prominent engineer, who could readily direct and coordinate the work and resolve problems equitably. Then, over, the first thirty years or so of the 20th century this system was progressively displaced by the practice of competitive bidding on plans and specifications prepared by a design engineer retained by the owner. As a result the responsibility for the structure previously carried by the designer-builder became divided, with the designer taking responsibility for service integrity of the completed structure while prime responsibility for structural adequacy and safety during construction was assumed by the contractor. Full control over the preparation of the plans and specifications — the contract documents — was retained by the design engineer.

This divided responsibility has resulted in contract documents that may not be altogether equitable, since the designer is inevitably under pressure to look after the immediate financial interests of his client, the owner. Documents prepared by only one party to a contract can hardly be expected to reflect the appropriate interest of the other party. However, until about mid-20th-century design and construction responsibilities for major bridgework, although divided between the design engineer and the construction engineer, were nonetheless usually under the control of leading members of the bridge engineering profession who were able to command the level of communication and cooperation needed for resolution of inevitable differences of opinion within a framework of equity and good will.

Since the 1970s there has been a trend away from this traditional system of control. The business and management aspects of design firms have become increasingly important, while at the same time steelwork construction firms have become more oriented toward commercial and legal considerations. Professional design and construction engineers have lost stature correspondingly. As a result of these adverse trends, bridgework specifications are being ever more stringently drawn, bidding practices are becoming increasingly aggressive, claims for extra reimbursement are proliferating, insurance costs for all concerned are rising, and control of bridge engineering and construction is being influenced to an increasing extent by administrators and attorneys. These developments have not benefited the bridge owners, the design engineering profession, the steelwork construction industry, or the public — which must ultimately pay all of the costs of bridge construction.

It seems clear that in order to move forward out of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, a comprehensive set of standard conditions for contracting should be developed to serve as a core document for civil engineering construction — a document that would require only the addition of special provisions in order to constitute the basic specifications for any major bridge construction project. Such standard conditions would have to be prepared “off line” by a group of high-level engineering delegates having well established engineering credentials.

A core contract document such as the one proposed has been in general use in Great Britain since 1945, when the first edition of the *Conditions of Contract and Forms of Tender, Agreement and Bond for Use in Connection with Works of Civil Engineering Construction* was published by The Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE). This document, known informally as *The ICE Conditions of Contract*, is now in its 6th edition [1]. It is kept under review and revised as necessary by a permanent Joint Contracts Committee consisting of delegates from The Institution of Civil Engineers, The Association of Consulting Engineers, and The Federation of Civil Engineering Contractors. This document is used as the basis for the majority of works of civil engineering construction that are contracted in Great Britain, including steel bridges.

Further comments on the perceived need for U.S. standard conditions for contracting can be found in [7].

45.25 Design-and-Construct

As has been mentioned, design-and-construct was common practice in the U.S. during the 19th century. Probably the most notable example was the Brooklyn Bridge, where the designer-builders were John A. Roebling and his son Washington A. Roebling. Construction of the Brooklyn Bridge was begun in 1869 and completed in 1883. Design-and-construct continued in use through the early years of the 20th century; the most prominent example from that era may be the Ambassador suspension bridge between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario, Canada, completed in 1929. The Ambassador Bridge was designed and built by the McClintic Marshall Construction Co., Jonathan Jones, chief engineer; it has an 1850 ft main span, at that time the world's record single span.

Design-and-construct has not been used for a major steel bridge in the U.S. since the Ambassador Bridge. However, the procedure has seen significant use throughout the 20th century for bridges in other countries and particularly in Europe; and most recently design-construct-operate-maintain has come into the picture. Whether these procedures will find significant application in the U.S. remains to be seen.

The advantages of design-and-construct are readily apparent:

1. More prospective designs are likely to come forward, than when designs are obtained from only a single organization.
2. Competitive designs are submitted at a preliminary level, making it possible for the owner to provide some input to the selected design between the preliminary stage and design completion.
3. The owner knows the price of the project at the time the preliminary design is selected, as compared with design-bid where the price is not known until the design is completed and bids are received.
4. As the project goes forward the owner deals with only a single entity, thereby reducing and simplifying his administrative effort.

5. The design-and-construct team members must work effectively together, eliminating the antagonisms and confrontations that can occur on a design-bid project.

A key requirement in the design-and-construct system for a project is the meticulous preparation of the request-for-proposals (RFP). The following essentials should be covered in suitable detail and clarity:

1. Description of project to be constructed.
2. Scope of work.
3. Structural component types and characteristics: which are required, which are acceptable, and which are not acceptable.
4. Minimum percentages of design and construction work that must be performed by the team's own forces.
5. Work schedules; time incentives and disincentives.
6. Procedure to be followed when actual conditions are found to differ from those assumed.
7. Quality control and quality assurance factors.
8. Owner's approval prerogatives during final-design stage and construction stage.
9. Applicable local, state and federal regulations.
10. Performance and payment bonding requirements.
11. Warranty requirements.
12. Owner's procedure for final approval of completed project.

In preparing the RFP, the owner should muster all necessary resources from both inside and outside his organization. Political considerations should be given due attention. Document drafts should receive the appropriate reviews, and an RFP brought forward that is in near-final condition. Then, at the start of the contracting process, the owner will typically proceed as follows:

1. Announce the project and invite prospective teams to submit qualifications.
2. Prequalify a small number of teams, perhaps three to five, and send the draft RFP to each.
3. Hold a meeting with the prequalified teams for informal exchange of information and to discuss questions.
4. Prepare the final RFP and issue it to each prequalified team, and announce the date on which proposals will be due.

The owner will customarily call for the proposals to be submitted in two separate components: the design component, showing the preliminary design carried to about the 25% level; and the monetary component, stating the lump-sum bid. Before the bids are opened the owner will typically carry out a scoring process for the preliminary designs, not identifying the teams with their designs, using a 10 point or 100 point grading scale and giving consideration to the following factors:

1. Quality of the design,
2. Bridge aesthetics.
3. Fabrication and erection feasibility and reliability.
4. Construction safety aspects.
5. Warranty and long-term maintenance considerations.
6. User costs.

Using these and other such scoring factors (which can be assigned weights if desired), a final overall design score is assigned to each preliminary design. Then the lump-sum bids are opened. A typical procedure is to divide each team's bid price by its design score, yielding an overall price rating, and to award the contract to the design-and-construct team having the lowest price rating.

Following the contract award the successful team will proceed to bring its preliminary design up to the final-design level, with no site work permitted during this interval. It is customary for the owner to award each unsuccessful submitting team a stipend to partially offset the costs of proposal preparation.

45.26 Construction Engineering Procedures and Practices — The Future

The many existing differences of opinion and procedures in respect to proper governance of steelwork fabrication and erection for major steel bridges raises the question: How do proper bridge construction guidelines come into existence and find their way into practice and into bridge specifications? Looking back over the period roughly from 1900 to 1975, we find that the major steelwork construction companies in the U.S. developed and maintained competent engineering departments that planned and engineered large bridges (and smaller ones as well) through the fabrication and erection processes with a high degree of proficiency. Traditionally, the steelwork contractor's engineers worked in cooperation with design-office engineers to develop the full range of bridgework technical factors, including construction procedure and practices.

However, times have changed; since the 1970's major steel bridge contractors have all but disappeared in the U.S., and further, very few bridge design offices have on their staffs engineers experienced in fabrication and erection engineering. As a result, construction engineering often receives less attention and effort than it needs and deserves, and this is not a good omen for the future of the design and construction of large bridges in the U.S.

Bridge construction engineering is not a subject that is or can be taught in the classroom; it must be learned on the job with major steelwork contractors. The best route for an aspiring young construction engineer is to spend significant amounts of time in the fabricating shop and at the bridge site, interspersed with time doing construction-engineering technical work in the office. It has been pointed out previously that although construction engineering and design engineering are related, they constitute different practices and require diverse backgrounds and experience. Design engineering can essentially be learned in the design office; construction engineering, however, cannot — it requires a background of experience at work sites. Such experience, it may be noted, is valuable also for design engineers; however, it is not as necessary for them as it is for construction engineers.

The training of future steelwork construction engineers in the U.S. will be handicapped by the demise of the "Big Two" steelwork contractors in the 1970s. Regrettably, it appears that surviving steelwork contractors in the U.S. generally do not have the resources for supporting strong engineering departments, and so there is some question as to where the next generation of steel bridge construction engineers in the U.S. will be coming from.

45.27 Concluding Comments

In closing this review of steel bridge construction it is appropriate to quote from the work of an illustrious British engineer, teacher, and author, the late Sir Alfred Pugsley [15]:

A further crop of [bridge] accidents arose last century from overloading by traffic of various kinds, but as we have seen, engineers today concentrate much of their effort to ensure that a margin of strength is provided against this eventuality. But there is one type of collapse that occurs almost as frequently today as it has over the centuries: collapse at a late stage of erection.

The erection of a bridge has always presented its special perils and, in spite of ever-increasing care over the centuries, few great bridges have been built without loss of life. Quite apart from the vagaries of human error, with nearly all bridges there comes a critical time near completion when the success of the bridge hinges on some special operation. Among such are ... the fitting of a last section ... in a steel arch, the insertion of the closing central [members] in a cantilever bridge, and the lifting of the roadway deck [structure] into

position on a suspension bridge. And there have been major accidents in many such cases. It may be wondered why, if such critical circumstances are well known to arise, adequate care is not taken to prevent an accident. Special care is of course taken, but there are often reasons why there may still be “a slip bewixt cup and lip”. Such operations commonly involve unusually close cooperation between constructors and designers, and between every grade of staff, from the laborers to the designers and directors concerned; and this may put a strain on the design skill, on detailed inspection, and on practical leadership that is enough to exhaust even a Brunel.

In such circumstances it does well to ... recall [the] dictum ... that “it is essential not to have faith in human nature. Such faith is a recent heresy and a very disastrous one.” One must rely heavily on the lessons of past experience in the profession. Some of this experience is embodied in professional papers describing erection processes, often (and particularly to young engineers) superficially uninteresting. Some is crystallized in organizational habits, such as the appointment of resident engineers from both the contracting and [design] sides. And some in precautions I have myself endeavored to list ...

It is an easy matter to list such precautions and warnings, but quite another for the senior engineers responsible for the completion of a bridge to stand their ground in real life. This is an area of our subject that depends in a very real sense on the personal qualities of bridge engineers ... At bottom, the safety of our bridges depends heavily upon the integrity of our engineers, particularly the leading ones.